Abstract. In 2013, Joux and then Barbulescu et al. presented new algorithms for computing discrete logarithms in finite fields of small characteristic. Shortly thereafter, Adj et al. presented a concrete analysis showing that, when combined with some steps from classical algorithms, the new algorithms render the finite field F 3 6·509 weak for pairing-based cryptography. Granger and Zumbrägel then presented a modification of the new algorithms that extends their effectiveness to a wider range of fields.
Introduction
Let F q denote a finite field of order q, and let E be an elliptic curve defined over F q with #E(F q ) = cr where r is prime with gcd(r, q) = 1 and c ≪ r. Let k be the embedding degree of E, i.e., the smallest positive integer satisfying r | q k −1. The Weil and Tate pairings can be used to reduce the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in the order-r subgroup of E(F q ) to the discrete logarithm problem in the order-r subgroup of F * q k [10, 18] . Hence, the security of cryptosystems implemented using elliptic curves with small embedding degrees is dependent on the intractability of the DLP in (the multiplicative group of) F q k .
Elliptic curves having small embedding degree k have been used to implement pairingbased protocols [4, 6] . In this paper, we are interested in the k = 4 supersingular elliptic curves Y 2 + Y = X 3 + X and Y 2 + Y = X 3 + X + 1 defined over characteristic-two finite fields, and the k = 6 supersingular elliptic curves Y 2 = X 3 − X ± 1 defined over characteristic-three finite fields.
The security of these elliptic curves has been severely tarnished due to the recent algorithms of Joux [14] , Göloglu et al. [11] , and Barbulescu et al. [3] . More precisely, Joux developed an L Q [ that is subexponential in log Q. Shortly thereafter, Barbulescu et al. presented a new DLP algorithm which, for many choices of field sizes, is asymptotically faster than all previous algorithms. In particular, in the case where q is a power of 2 or 3 with q ≈ n and n ≤ q +2, the DLP in F q 2n = F Q can be solved in quasi-polynomial time (log Q) O(log log Q) .
While the new quasi-polynomial time algorithm (QPA) of Barbulescu et al. is asymptotic in nature (see §2), Adj et al. [1] showed that, when combined with some steps from classical algorithms, they can have a considerable impact on the security of pairing-based protocols in practice. Let E denote the supersingular elliptic curve Y 2 = X 3 − X + 1 over F 3 509 . Then #E(F 3 509 ) = 7r where r is an 804-bit prime. The finite field F 3 6·509 offers approximately 128 bits of security against attacks on the DLP by Coppersmith's algorithm [8] (see [16] ). However, the concrete analysis in Adj et al. demonstrates that the order-r subgroup of the multiplicative group of this field offers at most 82 bits of security against the new attacks of Joux and Barbulescu et al.
The setup in Joux's algorithm imposes some restrictions on the algorithm parameters which limits the range of fields on which the algorithm is effective. Suppose that one wishes to compute logarithms in F q 2n , 1 where q is the power of a small prime and n is prime. Joux's algorithm represents F q 2n as F q 2 [X]/(I X ), where I X is a degree-n irreducible factor of h 1 X q − h 0 in F q 2 [X] , and h 0 , h 1 ∈ F q 2 [X] have small degree (say, 2); hence, one must have n ≤ q + 2. For example, logarithms in F 3 6·509 can be computed by first embedding the field in the quadratic extension F (3 6 ) 2·509 ; one can take q = 3 6 = 729 and n = 509. However, if one wishes to compute logarithms in F 3 6·1429 , then the smallest extension that meets the setup criteria is F (3 9 ) 2·1429 ; this field is too large for the new attacks to be effective.
At ECC 2013, Granger and Zumbrägel [12] presented a modification of the new algorithms that alleviates the aforementioned restrictions. Their idea is to select I X as a degree-n irreducible factor of h 1 (X q )·X −h 0 (X q ), where h 0 , h 1 ∈ F q 2 [X] have small degree (say, 2); the condition on q and n is then relaxed to n ≤ 2q + 1. While this modification does not affect the asymptotic run time of the new algorithms, it is very successful in increasing the effectiveness of the new algorithms in practice. For example, the k = 4 elliptic curve E : Y 2 + Y = X 3 + X over F 2 1223 has #E(F 2 1223 ) = 5r where r is a 1221-bit prime. The finite field F 2 4·1223 offers approximately 128 bits of security against attacks on the DLP by Coppersmith's algorithm. However, by embedding F 2 4·1223 in F (2 10 ) 2·1223 , Granger and Zumbrägel reported that the order-r subgroup of the multiplicative group of F 2 4·1223 offers at most 95 bits of security against the new attacks. As a second example, one can embed F 3 6·1429 in F (3 6 ) 2·1429 and then the condition n ≤ 2q + 1 is satisfied with q = 3 6 and n = 1429.
The purpose of this paper is to show that the new algorithms of Joux and Barbulescu et al., as modified by Granger and Zumbrägel, can have a drastic impact on the security of the k = 4 and k = 6 supersingular elliptic curves at higher security levels. More precisely, we consider the k = 6 elliptic curve E 1 : Y 2 = X 3 − X − 1 over F 3 1429 and the k = 4
1 In general, one wishes to compute logarithms in F p ℓn where p is a small prime and n is prime. To accomplish this, one embeds F p ℓn in F (p b ) cn where c > 1 and ℓ | bc. In this paper, we will only consider the case c = 2.
elliptic curve E 2 : Y 2 + Y = X 3 + X over F 2 3041 . We have #E 1 (F 3 1429 ) = cr where r is a 2223-bit prime and c is a 43-bit cofactor, and #E(F 2 3041 ) = r where r is a 3041-bit prime. The finite fields F 3 6·1429 and F 2 4·3041 offer approximately 192 bits of security against attacks on the DLP by Coppersmith's algorithm. In contrast, our concrete analysis shows that the order-r subgroups of the multiplicative groups of these fields offer, respectively, at most 96 of security against the new attack with the Granger-Zumbrägel polynomial representation, and 129 bits of security against the new attack with Joux's polynomial representation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we elaborate on the "asymptotic nature" of the Barbulescu et al. algorithm. In §3 we review the DLP algorithms of Joux and Barbulescu et al. as modified by Granger and Zumbrägel. Our concrete analyses for F 3 6·1429 and F 2 4·3041 are then presented in §4 and §5.
On the asymptotic nature of the QPA algorithm
Let E denote the supersingular elliptic curve Y 2 + Y = X 3 + X or Y 2 + Y = X 3 + X + 1 over F 2 n where n is prime, and suppose that #E(F 2 n ) = cr where r is prime and c ≪ r. The Weil and Tate pairings reduce the discrete logarithm problem in the order-r subgroup of E(F 2 n ) to the discrete logarithm problem in the order-r subgroup of the multiplicative group of F 2 4n . Coppersmith's subexponential-time algorithm [8] can be used to solve the latter problem.
In constrast, the QPA algorithm of Barbulescu et al. [3] tackles the problem by embedding F 2 4n in F q 2n where q = 2 ℓ ≈ n. The running time of the QPA algorithm is dominated by the descent stage. In this stage, one begins with a polynomial of degree (at most) n − 1 over F q 2 whose logarithm is sought. One then expresses the logarithm of this polynomial in terms of the logarithms of roughly q 2 polynomials of degree at most n/2. This process is applied recursively to each polynomial encountered in the "descent tree"; the logarithm of each such polynomial of degree d is expressed in terms of the logarithms of roughly q 2 polynomials of degree at most d/2. To terminate the recursion, the logarithms of all degree-1 polynomials are obtained using a relatively fast method.
The number of nodes in the descent tree gives a crude lower bound on the running time of the QPA algorithm. Since n ≈ q, the descent tree has approximately log 2 q levels and at least q 2 log 2 q nodes. Table 1 compares this lower bound with the running time C(q) = exp(1.526(log 2 4q ) 1/3 (log log 2 4q ) 2/3 ) of Coppersmith's algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in F 2 4q .
We see from Table 1 that the QPA algorithm is faster than Coppersmith's algorithm only when n ≈ q = 2 15 . However, such n are too large to be of interest in cryptography based on pairings over E(F 2 n ). To determine the implications of the QPA algorithm to the security of pairing-based cryptosystems based on E(F 2 n ), it is imperative that the descent stage of the QPA algorithm be combined with descent steps from classical algorithms. The asymptotic running time of the resulting hybrid algorithm is difficult to determine. Instead, the framework and tools introduced in [1] are used to perform a concrete analysis which provides a reasonably accurate picture of the effectiveness of the hybrid algorithm.2 log 2 q C(q) 2 9 2 162 2 93 2 10 2 200 2 124 2 11 2 242 2 165 2 12 2 288 2 219 2 13 2 338 2 290 2 14 2 392 2 382 2 15 2 450 2 501 Table 1 . Comparison of the running time q 2 log 2 q of the QPA algorithm for computing logarithms in F q 2n with q ≈ n, and the running time C(q) of Coppersmith's algorithm for computing logarithms in F 2 4n .
3. New DLP algorithm of Joux and Barbulescu et al.
The DLP algorithm we describe is due to Joux [14] , with a descent step from the quasi-polynomial time algorithm of Barbulescu et al. [3] , and a polynomial representation (selection of h 0 and h 1 ) due to Granger and Zumbrägel [12] . For lack of a better name, we will call this algorithm the "new DLP algorithm". The description of the algorithm closely follows the description in [1] ; the most important changes are the incorporation of the polynomial selection of Granger and Zumbrägel and the use of lattices in the classical descent stage.
Let F q 2n be a finite field where n ≤ 2q + 1. The elements of F q 2n are represented as polynomials of degree at most n − 1 over F q 2 . Let N = q 2n − 1. Let g be an element of order N in F * q 2n , and let h ∈ F * q 2n . We wish to compute log g h. The algorithm proceeds by first finding the logarithms of all degree-one ( §3.2) and degree-two ( §3.3) elements in F q 2n . Then, in the descent stage, log g h is expressed as a linear combination of logarithms of degree-one and degree-two F q 2n elements. The descent stage proceeds in several steps, each expressing the logarithm of a degree-D element as a linear combination of the logarithms of elements of degree ≤ m for some m < D. Four descent methods are used; these are described in §3.4- §3.7. The cost of each step is given in Table 2 . Notation. N q 2 (m, n) denotes the number of monic m-smooth degree-n polynomials in F q 2 [X], A q 2 (m, n) denotes the average number of distinct monic irreducible factors among all monic m-smooth degree-n polynomials in F q 2 [X], and S q 2 (m, d) denotes the cost of testing m-smoothness of a degree-d polynomial in F q 2 [X]. Formulas for N q 2 (m, n), A q 2 (m, n) and S q 2 (m, n) are given in [1] . For γ ∈ F q 2 , γ denotes the element γ q . For P ∈ F q 2 [X], P denotes the polynomial obtained by raising each coefficient of P to the power q. The cost of an integer addition modulo N is denoted by A N , and the cost of a multiplication in F q 2 is denoted by M q 2 . The projective general linear group of order 2 over F q is denoted PGL 2 (F q ). P q is a set of distinct representatives of the left cosets of PGL 2 (F q ) in PGL 2 (F q 2 ); note that #P q = q 3 + q. A matrix a b c d ∈ P q is identified with the quadruple (a, b, c, d). Table 2 . Estimated costs of the main steps of the new DLP algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in F q 2n . A N and M q 2 denote the costs of an addition modulo N and a multiplication in F q 2 . See §3.5 for the definitions of t 1 and t 2 . The Gröbner basis cost
has an irreducible factor I X of degree n in F q 2 [X]; we will henceforth assume that
The field F q 2n is represented as F q 2n = F q 2 [X]/(I X ) and the elements of F q 2n are represented as polynomials in F q 2 [X] of degree at most n − 1. Let g be a generator of F * q 2n .
3.2.
Finding logarithms of linear polynomials. Let B 1 = {X + a | a ∈ F q 2 }, and note that #B 1 = q 2 . To compute the logarithms of B 1 -elements, we first generate linear relations of these logarithms.
and then multiplying by (cX + d) q+1 yields
Replacing X by (h 0 /h 1 ) q in the linear terms aX + b and cX + d occurring in the left side of (4) and then clearing denominators yields
If the polynomial on the left side of (5) is 1-smooth, then taking logarithms of both sides of (5) yields a linear relation of the logarithms of B 1 -elements and the logarithm of h 1 . The probability that the left side of (5) is 1-smooth is N q 2 (1, 3)/q 6 ≈ 1 6 . Thus, after approximately 6q 2 trials one expects to obtain (slightly more than) q 2 relations. The cost of the relation generation stage is 6q 2 · S q 2 (1, 3). The logarithms can then be obtained by using Wiedemann's algorithm for solving sparse systems of linear equations [19] . The expected cost of the linear algebra is q 5 · A N since each equation has approximately q nonzero terms.
3.3. Finding logarithms of irreducible quadratic polynomials. Let u ∈ F q 2 , and let Q(X) = X 2 + uX + v ∈ F q 2 [X] be an irreducible quadratic. Define B 2,u to be the set of all irreducible quadratics of the form X 2 + uX + w in F q 2 [X]; one expects that #B 2,u ≈ (q 2 − 1)/2. The logarithms of all elements in B 2,u are found simultaneously using one application of QPA descent (see §3.6). More precisely, one first collects relations of the form (13) , where the left side of (13) factors as a product of linear polynomials (whose logarithms are known). The expected number of relations one can obtain is
·(q 3 +q). Provided that this number is significantly greater than #B 2,u , the matrix H(Q) is expected to have full (column) rank. One can then solve the resulting system of linear equations to obtain the logarithms of all irreducible translates Q + w of Q. This step is repeated for each u ∈ F q 2 . Hence, there are q 2 independent linear systems of equations to be solved.
For each u ∈ F q 2 , the cost of relation generation is q 14 /N q 2 (1, 6) · S q 2 (1, 6), while the linear algebra cost is q 5 · A N .
3.4.
Continued-fraction descent. Recall that we wish to compute log g h, where h ∈ F q 2n = F q 2 [X]/(I X ). We will henceforth assume that deg h = n − 1. The descent stage begins by multiplying h by a random power of g. The extended Euclidean algorithm is used to express the resulting field element h ′ in the form h ′ = w 1 /w 2 where deg w 1 , deg w 2 ≈ n/2 [5] ; for simplicity, we shall assume that n is odd and deg w 1 = deg w 2 = (n − 1)/2. This process is repeated until both w 1 and w 2 are m-smooth for some chosen m < (n − 1)/2. This gives log g h ′ as a linear combination of logarithms of polynomials of degree at most m. The expected cost of this continued-fraction descent step is approximately
The expected number of distinct irreducible factors of w 1 and w 2 is 2A q 2 (m, (n − 1)/2). In the analysis, we shall assume that each of these irreducible factors has degree exactly m. The logarithm of each of these degree-m polynomials is then expressed as a linear combination of logarithms of smaller degree polynomials using one of the descent methods described in §3.5, §3.6 and §3.7.
3.5. Classical descent. Let p be the characteristic of F q , and let q = p ℓ . Let s ∈ [0, ℓ], and let R ∈ F q 2 [X, Y ]. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume in this section that
where R ′ is obtained from R by raising all its coefficients to the power p s . Hence
with deg Q = D, and let m < D. In the Joux-Lercier descent method [15] , as modified by Göloglu et al. [11] , one selects s ∈ [0, ℓ] and searches for a polynomial
); (ii) deg R 1 /Q and deg R 2 are appropriately balanced where R 2 = R ′ (X p s , X); and (iii) both R 1 /Q and R 2 are msmooth. Taking logarithms of both sides of (7) then gives an expression for log g Q in terms of the logarithms of polynomials of degree at most m.
A family of polynomials R satisfying (i) and (ii) can be constructed by finding a basis
The number of lattice points to consider is therefore (q 2 ) 2δ . We have deg
In order to ensure that there are sufficiently many such lattice points to generate a polynomial R for which both R 1 /Q and R 2 are m-smooth, the parameters s and δ must be selected so that
.
Ignoring the time to compute a balanced basis of L Q , the expected cost of finding a polynomial R satisfying (i)-(iii) is
The expected number of distinct irreducible factors of R 1 /Q and R 2 is A q 2 (m,
In the analysis, we shall assume that each of these irreducible factors has degree exactly m. An alternative to the above method is to select s ∈ [0, ℓ] and search for
(ii) deg R 1 and deg R 2 /Q are appropriately balanced; and (iii) both R 1 and R 2 /Q are m-smooth. A family of polynomials R satisfying (i) and (ii) can be constructed by finding a basis {(u 1 , u 2 ), (v 1 , v 2 )} of the lattice
The points (w 1 , w 2 ) in L Q can be sampled as before to obtain polynomials R(X, Y ) = w ′′ 1 (Y ) − w ′′ 2 (Y )X satisfying (i) and (ii) where w ′′ is obtained from w by raising all its coefficients to the power p −s . We have deg
In order to ensure that there are sufficiently many such lattice points to generate a polynomial R for which both R 1 and R 2 /Q are m-smooth, the parameters s and δ must be selected so that
The expected number of distinct irreducible factors of
into the systematic equation (3) and multiplying by (cQ + d) q+1 yields
Noticing that
where
Note that the polynomial within the main parentheses on the left side of (13) has degree ≤ 3D. If this polynomial is m-smooth, then (13) yields a linear relation of the logarithms of some degree-m polynomials and logarithms of translates of Q. After collecting slightly more than q 2 such relations, one searches for a linear combination of these relations that eliminates all translates of Q except for Q itself. To achieve this, consider row vectors in (Z N ) q 2 with coordinates indexed by elements λ ∈ F q 2 . For each relation, we define a vector v whose entry v λ is 1 if Q − λ appears in the right side of (13), and 0 otherwise. If the resulting matrix H(Q) of row vectors has full column rank, then one obtains an expression for log g Q in terms of the logarithms of polynomials of degree ≤ m. The number of distinct polynomials of degree ≤ m in this expression is expected to be A q 2 (m, 3D) · q 2 ; in the analysis we shall assume that each of these polynomials has degree exactly m.
Since the probability that a degree-3D polynomial is m-smooth is N q 2 (m, 3D)/(q 2 ) 3D , one must have (14) N q 2 (m, 3D) q 6D · (q 3 + q) ≫ q in order to ensure that H(Q) has ≫ q 2 rows, whereby H(Q) can be expected to have full rank. The expected cost of the relation generation portion of QPA descent is q 6D+2 ·S q 2 (m, 3D)/ N q 2 (m, 3D), while the cost of the linear algebra is q 5 · A N .
as can be seen by making the substitution Y → k 1 /k 2 into the systematic equation (3) and clearing denominators. Note that deg(
If R is m-smooth, we obtain a linear relationship between log g Q and logs of degree-m polynomials by taking logarithms of both sides of the following:
To determine (k 1 , k 2 , R) that satisfy
one can transform (16) into a system of multivariate bilinear equations over F q . Specifically, each coefficient of k 1 , k 2 and R is written using two variables over F q , the two variables representing the real and imaginary parts of that coefficient (which is in F q 2 ). The coefficients of k 1 and k 2 can then be written in terms of the coefficients of k 1 and k 2 . Hence, equating coefficients of X i of both sides of (16) yields 3m + 1 quadratic equations. The real and imaginary parts of each of these equations are equated, yielding 6m + 2 bilinear equations in 10m − 2D + 6 variables over F q . This system of equations can be solved by finding a Gröbner basis for the ideal it generates. Finally, solutions (k 1 , k 2 , R) are tested until one is found for which R is m-smooth. This yields an expression for log g Q in terms of the logarithms of approximately q + 1 + A q 2 (m, 3m − D) polynomials of degree (at most) m; in the analysis we shall assume that each of the polynomials has degree exactly m. Now, the number of candidate pairs (k 1 , k 2 ) is ((q 2 ) m+1 ) 2 = q 4(m+1) . Denote by R(m, D) the expected number of distinct R obtainable. Then the condition
can ensure that there exists a solution (k 1 , k 2 , R) for which R is m-smooth. The number R(m, D) has not been determined and is best estimated experimentally.
It is difficult to determine the exact cost G q 2 (m, D) of the Gröbner basis finding step. After the Gröbner basis is found, the cost to find an m-smooth R is (q 2 ) 3m−D /N q 2 (m, 3m− D) · S q 2 (m, 3m − D).
Computing discrete logarithms in F 3 6·1429
We present a concrete analysis of the DLP algorithm described in §3 for computing discrete logarithms in F 3 6·1429 . In fact, this field is embedded in the quadratic extension field F 3 12·1429 , and it is the latter field where the DLP algorithm of §3 is executed. Thus, we have q = 3 6 = 729 and n = 1429.
As mentioned in §1, our main motivation for finding discrete logarithms in F 3 6·1429 is to attack the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem in E 1 (F 3 1429 ) , where E 1 is the supersingular elliptic curve Y 2 = X 3 − X − 1 with #E 1 (F 3 1429 ) = cr; here c = 7622150170693 is a 43-bit cofactor and r = (3 1429 − 3 715 + 1)/c is a 2223-bit prime. The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem in the order-r subgroup of E 1 (F 3 1429 ) can be efficiently reduced to the discrete logarithm problem in the order-r subgroup of F * 3 12·1429 . In the latter problem, we are given two elements α, β of order r in F * 3 12·1429 and we wish to find log α β. It can be readily seen that log α β = (log g β)/(log g α) mod r, where g is a generator of F * 3 12·1429 . Thus, we will henceforth assume that h has order r and that we only need to find log g h mod r. An immediate consequence of this restriction is that all the linear algebra in the new algorithm can be performed modulo the 2223-bit r instead of modulo the 27179-bit N .
The parameters for each step of the algorithm were carefully chosen in order to balance the running time of the steps. We also took into account the degree to which each step could be parallelized on conventional computers. A summary of the parameter choices for the descent is given in Figure 1 . The cost of each step is given in Table 3. 4.1. Setup. We chose the representations F 3 6 = F 3 [U ]/(U 6 + 2U 4 + U 2 + 2U + 2) and 12 [X] and h 1 = 1, and I X ∈ F 3 12 [X] to be the degree-1429 monic irreducible factor of h 1 (X 3 6 ) · X − h 0 (X 3 Figure 1 . A typical path of the descent tree for computing an individual logarithm in F 3 12·1429 (q = 3 6 ). The numbers in parentheses next to each node are the expected number of nodes at that level. 'Time' is the expected time to generate all nodes at a level. 4.6. QPA descent. Two QPA descent stages are employed. In the first stage, we have D = 16 and select m = 11. For each Q, the expected cost of relation generation is 2 30.9 · S q 2 (11, 48) and the cost of the linear algebra is 2 48 A r . Also for each Q, the expected number of distinct polynomials of degree at most 11 obtained is expected to be A q 2 (11, 48)· q 2 ≈ 2 22 . Thus, the total number of distinct polynomials of degree at most 11 obtained after the first QPA descent stage is approximately 2 37 .
In the second stage, we have D = 11 and select m = 7. For each Q, the expected cost of relation generation is 2 28.4 · S q 2 (7, 33) and the cost of the linear algebra is 2 48 A r . Also for each Q, the expected number of distinct polynomials of degree at most 7 obtained is expected to be A q 2 (7, 33) · q 2 ≈ 2 22 . Thus, the total number of distinct polynomials of degree at most 7 obtained after the second QPA descent stage is approximately 2 59 . For all three stages, we use the experimental results from §4.7 of [1] . The experiments were run using Magma v2.19-7 [17] on a 2.9 GHz Intel core i7-3520M.
4.8.
Overall running time. The second column of Table 3 gives the running time estimates for the main steps of the new DLP algorithm in three units of time: A r , M q 2 , and seconds. In order to assess the overall time, we make some assumptions about the ratios of these units of time.
First, we shall assume that A r /M q 2 = 2 3 . To justify this, we observe that a 2223-bit integer can be stored in 35 64-bit words. The X86-64 instruction set has an ADD operation that adds two 64-bit unsigned integers in one clock cycle. Hence, integer addition can be completed in 35 clock cycles. Modular reductions comprises one conditional statement plus one subtraction (required in roughly half of all modular additions). One can use a lazy reduction technique that amortizes the cost of a modular reduction among many integer additions. All in all, the cost of A r can be estimated to be 35 clock cycles. Unlike for 64-bit integer multiplication, there is no native support for F 3 12 multiplication on an Intel Core i7 machine. However, we expect that a specially designed multiplier could be built to achieve a multiplication cost of 4 clock cycles. This gives us an A r /M q 2 ratio of approximately 2 3 .
Next, since a multiplication in M q 2 can be done in 4 clock cycles, we will transform one second on a 2.9 GHz machine (on which the Gröbner bases descent experiments were performed) into 2 30 M q 2 .
Using these estimates, we see from the third column of Table 3 that the overall running time of the new algorithm is approximately 2 95.8 M q 2 . We note that the relation generation, continued-fraction descent, classical descent, and Gröbner bases descent steps, and also the relation generation portion of QPA descent, are effectively parallelizable in the sense that one can essentially achieve a factor-C speedup if C processors are available. Moreover, the linear system of equations for finding logarithms of linear polynomials, the 3 12 ≈ 2 19 linear systems of equations for finding logarithms of irreducible quadratic polynomials, and the 2 15 +2 37 linear systems of equations in QPA descent are also effectively parallelizable since each linear system can be solved in less than one day using a small number of GPUs and CPUs (cf. [13] and [2] ).
4.9.
Comparisons. The upper bound of 2 95.8 M q 2 on the running time of the new algorithm for computing logarithms in F 2 6·1429 convincingly demonstrates that this field offers drastically less security than the 2 192 resistance to attacks by Coppersmith's algorithm [8, 16] . The decrease in security is even more pronounced when one considers that Coppersmith's algorithm is non-parallelizable since a dominant step is the solution of an enormous system of linear equations, whereas the new algorithm is effectively parallelizable.
Also striking is the relatively small difference between the 2 95.8 M q 2 running time with the estimate of 2 81.7 M q 2 for F 3 6·509 [1] (in both cases, we have q = 3 6 ). The security levels for F 3 6·1429 and F 3 6·509 against Coppersmith's attack differ by 192−128 = 64 bits. However, the security levels against the new attack differ by only 14.1 bits.
Computing discrete logarithms in F 2 4·3041
We present a concrete analysis of the DLP algorithm described in §3 of [1] for computing discrete logarithms in F 2 4·3041 . Note that the algorithm employed in this section uses the original polynomial representation h 1 X q −h 0 of Joux [14] . As with the algorithm described in §3 of this paper, we employ lattices in the classical descent stages, and use Wiedemann's algorithm for performing linear algebra.
The field F 2 4·3041 is embedded in the sextic extension F 2 24·3041 , and it is in the latter field where the DLP algorithm is executed. Thus, we have q = 2 12 = 2048 and n = 3041.
As mentioned in §1, our main motivation for finding discrete logarithms in F 2 4·3041 is to attack the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem in E 2 (F 2 3041 ), where E 2 is the supersingular elliptic curve Y 2 +Y = X 3 +X with #E 2 (F 2 3041 ) = r and r = 2 3041 −2 1521 +1 is a 3041-bit prime. The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem in the order-r subgroup of E 2 (F 2 3041 ) can be efficiently reduced to the discrete logarithm problem in the order-r subgroup of F * 2 4·3041 . We wish to compute log g h mod r, where g is a generator of F * 2 4·3041
and h ∈ F * 2 4·3041 has order r. Hence, all the linear algebra in the new algorithm is performed modulo the 3041-bit r.
A summary of the parameter choices for the descent is given in Figure 2 . The cost of each step is given in Table 4 . Table 4 . Estimated costs of the main steps of the new DLP algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in F 2 24·3041 (q = 2 12 ). A r and M q 2 denote the costs of an addition modulo the 3041-bit prime r and a multiplication in F 2 24 . We use the cost ratio A r /M q 2 = 2 4 , and also assume that 2 28 multiplications in F 2 24 can be performed in 1 second (cf. §5.8).
5.1. Setup. We chose the representations
and
[X] and h 1 = X + U 2339 V + U 807 , and 
where R ′ is obtained from R by raising all its coefficients to the power p s . Let Q ∈ F q 2 [X] with deg Q = D, and let m < D. One selects s ∈ [0, ℓ] and searches for a polynomial R ∈ F q 2 [X, Y ] such that (i) Q | R 1 where R 1 = R(X, X p ℓ−s ); (ii) deg R 1 /Q and deg R 2 are appropriately balanced where R 2 = h e 1 · R ′ (X p s , h 0 /h 1 ); and (iii) both R 1 /Q and R 2 are m-smooth. Taking logarithms of both sides of (18) then gives an expression for log g Q in terms of the logarithms of polynomials of degree at most m.
The points (w 1 , w 2 ) in L Q can be sampled to obtain polynomials R(X, Y ) = w 1 (X) − w 2 (X)Y satisfying (i) and (ii) by writing
In order to ensure that the number of lattice points considered is enough to generate a polynomial R such that both R 1 /Q and R 2 are m-smooth, the parameters s and δ must be selected so that
In the analysis, we shall assume that each of these irreducible factors has degree exactly m. Three classical descent stages are employed. In the first stage, we have D = 123 and select m = 39, s = 3, δ = 2, which yield t 1 = 575 and t 2 = 506. The expected cost of the descent stage for each of the 44 degree-123 polynomials is approximately 2 93.7 ·S q 2 (39, 452). The expected total number of distinct irreducible polynomials of degree (at most) 39 obtained is approximately 1760.
In the second classical descent stage we have D = 39 and select m = 24, s = 4, δ = 2, which yield t 1 = 277 and t 2 = 338. The expected cost of the descent for each of the 1760 degree-39 polynomials is approximately 2 90.2 · S q 2 (24, 238). The expected total number of distinct irreducible polynomials of degree (at most) 24 obtained is approximately 2 16 .
In the third classical descent stage we have D = 24 and select m = 20, s = 4, δ = 2, which yield t 1 = 270 and t 2 = 226. The expected cost of the descent for each of the 2 16 degree-24 polynomials is approximately 2 86.9 · S q 2 (24, 226). The expected total number of distinct irreducible polynomials of degree (at most) 20 obtained is approximately 2 21.3 .
5.6. QPA descent. Two QPA descent stages are employed. In the first stage, we have D = 20 and select m = 12. For each Q, the expected cost of relation generation is 2 34.8 · S q 2 (12, 60) and the cost of the linear algebra is 2 60 A r . Also for each Q, the expected number of distinct polynomials of degree at most 12 obtained is expected to be A q 2 (12, 60)· q 2 ≈ 2 33.2 . Thus, the total number of distinct polynomials of degree at most 12 obtained after the first QPA descent stage is approximately 2 54.5 .
In the second stage, we have D = 12 and select m = 7. For each Q, the expected cost of relation generation is 2 35 · S q 2 (7, 36) and the cost of the linear algebra is 2 60 A r . Also for each Q, the expected number of distinct polynomials of degree at most 7 obtained is expected to be A q 2 (7, 36) · q 2 ≈ 2 32.7 . Thus, the total number of distinct polynomials of degree at most 7 obtained after the second QPA descent stage is approximately 2 87.2 . In the first stage, for each degree-7 polynomial Q we have to solve a system of 26 quadratic polynomial equations in 32 variables over F q (cf. (16)). After fixing some variables, each degree-5 R obtained from the variety of the resulting ideal is tested for 4-smoothness. If no 4-smooth R is obtained, we randomly fix some other subset of variables and repeat. We ran 10,000 Gröbner bases descent experiments with randomly-selected degree-7 polynomials Q. On average, we had to find 1.806 Gröbner bases for each Q. The average number of R's tested for 4-smoothness for each Q was 1.252. The average time spent on each Q was 35.03 seconds.
For the second and third stages, we use the experimental results from §A.7 of [1].
5.8. Overall running time. The second column of Table 3 gives the running time estimates for the main steps of the new DLP algorithm in three units of time: A r , M q 2 , and seconds. In order to assess the overall time, we make some assumptions about the ratios of these units of time. First, we shall assume that A r /M q 2 = 2 4 . To justify this, we observe that a 3041-bit integer can be stored in 48 64-bit words. As in §4.8, the cost of A r can be estimated to be 48 clock cycles. Using the carry-less multiplication instruction PCLMULQDQ, a multiplication in F 2 24 can be performed at a price of 3-4 clock cycles. This gives us an A r /M q 2 ratio of approximately 2 4 .
Next, since a multiplication in M q 2 can be done in 15 clock cycles, we will transform one second on a 2.9 GHz machine (on which the Gröbner bases descent experiments were performed) into 2 28 M q 2 .
Using these estimates, we see from the third column of Table 4 that the overall running time of the new algorithm is approximately 2 129.3 M q 2 . The new algorithm is effectively parallelizable, since each linear system of equations can be expected to be solvable in less than 12 days using a small number of GPUs and CPUs (cf. [13, 2] ).
5.9.
Comparisons. The upper bound of 2 129.3 M q 2 on the running time of the new algorithm for computing logarithms in F 2 4·3041 convincingly demonstrates that this field offers drastically less security than the 2 192 resistance to attacks by Coppersmith's algorithm [8, 16] . As with the case of F 3 6·1429 , this decrease in security is even more pronounced when one considers that Coppersmith's algorithm is non-parallelizable whereas the new algorithm is effectively parallelizable.
